Twenty+ Tips In Fifty Minutes


This notice is posted on February 9, 2008. After this date this article will not be updated with new cases or changes to the statutes. However, the issues discussed here will be incorporated into the "Oklahoma Law" section of the Workers' Compensation website. You can find these materials with updates through the table of contents or by using the search engine. If you have any problems, please contact me.

DISCLAIMER

The purpose of this paper is to provide an unofficial summary and analysis of issues that are frequently addressed by the Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Court. It is intended to be a starting point or aid to your own research, and does not represent the views of the Court or its judges. Do not rely solely on the information set out herein if it might affect your legal rights or your decision on handling a workers' compensation claim. Where possible, hyperlinks to statutes, court opinions, and court rules are provided to give you easy access to the underlying law so you may form your own interpretation of those resources. This paper is one judge's comments, and I reserve the right to change my mind at any time. Judge Tom Leonard

1. Soft Tissue Injuries

Benefits available to an injured worker with a nonsurgical "soft tissue injury" are limited to "appropriate and necessary medical care and temporary total disability." The worker may not receive permanent partial disability compensation unless there is objective medical evidence of permanent anatomical abnormality. 85 O.S., §22(3)(d). To determine whether this limitation applies, it is useful to ask the following questions.

Is it really soft tissue?

Definition from §22(3)(d): ‘soft tissue injury’ means damage to one or more of the tissues that surround bones and joints. ‘Soft tissue injury’ includes, but is not limited to: sprains, strains, contusions, tendinitis, and muscle tears. Cumulative trauma is to be considered a soft tissue injury.

The statutory definition includes three exceptions to the soft tissue category that are not very useful for determining whether limited benefits apply.

  1. Injury to or disease of the spine, spinal disks, spinal nerves or spinal cord, where corrective surgery is performed. There is a rather convoluted implication which has been advanced that without surgery these types of injury are soft tissue. However, the spine is a bony structure and is therefore not soft tissue. A spinal disk is soft tissue that is between the vertebrae, and therefore is not one of the "tissues that surround bones and joints." The spinal cord is soft tissue like the brain that is surrounded by bone, not vice versa. None of these exceptions meet the definition although spinal disk injury is arguably very close.
  2. Brain injuries. The brain is a soft tissue, but not “soft tissue” as defined in statute, because the brain is an organ that does not surround bone but is itself surrounded by bone.
  3. Total knee replacement is clearly a bony injury.

Is it nonsurgical?

Surgery is that branch of medical science concerned with the correction of deformities, repair of injuries, diagnosis and cure of disease, relief of suffering and prolongation of life by manual and instrumental operations. Webster's International Dictionary

85 O.S., §22(3)(d) "soft tissue" TTD limitations only apply to nonsurgical cases. Claimants who have received surgery are entitled to up to 300 weeks of TTD benefits. Sysco Food Services v. Cunningham, 2007 OK CIV APP 52, 162 P.3d 973.

An epidural steroid injection and a myelogram are surgical procedures. Claimant alleged an ESI was a surgical procedure in the case of Boyce Manor Nursing Home v. Kaylor, COCA, Div IV, Case No. 104,035 (unpublished). The Court cited with approval, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Barfield , 80 S.E.2d 84 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954), in which the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded a myelogram constituted "surgery" in the context of workers' compensation law. In Boyce Manor, the Court stated, "An epidural steroid injection is clearly a manual and instrumental operation for relief of suffering. It involves the same type of invasive 'penetration of living tissue,' as the myelogram in the Hartford Accident & Indemnity case. Accordingly, we believe an ordinary person would understand that this invasive procedure is 'surgery' because it is 'performed manually by a surgeon … in a sterile aseptic surgical room.' We also believe that an ordinary person would understand that this procedure is 'corrective' because it provides relief from pain, albeit temporarily."

Does the eight-week TTD limitation apply in nonsurgical cases?

No, in three divisions of the Court of Civil Appeals (COCA). Conflicts in the soft tissue limitation of benefits has resulted in a judicial construction that 85 O.S. §22(2) applies to all cases. Gee v. All 4 Kids, Inc., 2006 OK CIV APP 155, 149 P.3d 1106 (Div I); Curling v. City Chevrolet, 2007 OK CIV APP 63, 164 P.3d 1141 (Div III); Sysco Food Services v. Cunningham, Div. IV, supra.

Yes, in Division IV of the COCA, the eight-week limitation has been upheld. Without any supporting cases or argument Div IV found that the conflicts are to be construed as a harmonious whole, disagreed with the Gee case, and limited TTD to eight weeks. Arcticshield Inc. v. Pye, COCA Div IV, Case No. 103,941 (unpublished). The argument supporting the limitation is also set out in the dissent of Judge Mitchell in Bed Bath and Beyond v. Bonat, COCA Div III, Case No. 104,284 (petition for certiorari pending).

There is a similar split in opinions of the COCA divisions on whether the eight-week limitation applies to temporary partial disability (TPD). Division II has held that TPD benefits are not limited because there is no express reference to TPD in the statute, only to TTD. Ameriresource Group v. Stroud, COCA Div. II, Case No. 103,556 (unpublished). Contra, Urrutia v. Wendy's Old Fashioned Hamburgers, COCA Div IV, 2007 OK CIV APP 104, ___ P.3d ___.

Urrutia also holds that compensation is similar to hernia because it follows the hernia section. Therefore, it is a "specific injury" limiting recovery to up to eight weeks. However, the same division refused to follow the hernia unreasonable delay cases in Arcticshield, Inc. v. Pye, supra.

2. Permanent Anatomical Abnormality (PAA)

An award for permanent partial disability is not allowed for a soft tissue injury unless "there is objective medical evidence of a permanent anatomical abnormality."

PAA is not defined in the statutes, therefore claimant must offer a competent medical report that addresses the issue. In the case of Dayton Tire v. McCann, COCA Div II, Case No. 103,614 (unpublished) the COCA approved a finding of PAA based on an apparently bare conclusion by Dr. McClure. Although Dr. McClure conducted a clinical examination of the worker, "there were no xrays or magnetic diagnostic imaging reports cited in support of his opinion that a permanent anatomical abnormality was present, and Dr. McClure did not describe the specific nature of the permanent anatomical abnormality."

Loss of earning capacity is evidence of PAA. 85 O.S., §22(3)(d) permits the Court to consider "credible medical evidence of permanent impairment to wage earning ability" in cases of soft tissue injury and in cases other than scheduled member injury cases (i.e. "other cases" class of disabilities). Evidence supporting or rebutting the assertion of loss of earning capacity should include a physician's opinion on the issue coupled with testimony to support the physician's opinion.

Loss of ROM, findings on x-ray, EMG or MRI if included in a rating medical report tend to support a finding of PAA.

3. Major Cause

"Major cause" means the predominate [sic] cause of the resulting injury or illness. 85 O.S. §3(16)

The "major cause" of a compensable injury must result from employment. 85 O.S., §3(7), (13), (16), (18). Medical opinions supporting employment as the major cause of occupational disease or age-related deterioration or degeneration, must be supported by objective medical evidence (i.e. in these cases, permanent anatomical abnormality and causation must be established by objective medical evidence). This term does not eliminate injury due to an aggravation of a pre-existing condition in cumulative trauma or single event injury cases.

Major cause is not a defense to the need for a particular course of medical treatment recommended for an injury determined to be compensable in a prior unappealed order. Irisdnt, Inc. v. Brock, 2008 OK CIV APP 5, __ P.3d __. Although claimant had two prior injuries to his knee, including surgery, employer admitted a work-related aggravation to the knee. When the treating physician recommended a total knee replacement, the employer asserted that the prior chondromalacia was the major cause of his need for a TKR.

4. Treating Physician Presumption

There shall be a rebuttable presumption in favor of the treating physician's opinions on the issue of temporary disability, permanent disability, causation, apportionment, rehabilitation or necessity of medical treatment. 85 O.S. §17A2a

According to 85 O.S. §17A2a offering the report of the treating physician raises a presumption in favor of the physician's opinions. This presumption may be rebutted by an opposing party’s competent medical report, including one from a hired physician, or the report of an IME. Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day School, 2007 OK 60, 163 P.3d 557; Rush Truck Center/OKC v. Watson, 2007 OK CIV APP 37, 159 P.3d 1146.

The Conaghan case held the appointment of an IME pursuant to §17 is not the sole procedural remedy for a party objecting to the report of a treating physician. This provision does not specifically preclude other evidence. To allow a treating physician to exclusively determine a claimant’s disability rating would usurp the court’s authority. Due process of law commands a workers’ compensation litigant — claimant or respondent — be allowed to introduce its own expert medical evidence.

5. Hernia

The Workers' Compensation Act, as amended in 2005, does not allow for an award of permanent partial disability for a first hernia. 85 O.S., §22(3)(d); Murphy v. Nabors Drilling, USA L.P., 2007 OK CIV APP 53, 162 P.3d 976. Hernia injuries are compensated at 6 weeks of TTD compensation, plus the cost of all medical treatment, including surgery. One additional 6 week period may be awarded if supported by medical evidence.

The 2005 amendment also eliminated the permanent partial disability benefits allowed under prior law for second or subsequent repair of hernia in the same area.

In spite of the limitations, permanent total disability may be claimed in appropriate cases. See, Fiesta Pools of Oklahoma City v. Pratt, 1965 OK 133, 405 P.2d 1014; Seismograph Service Corporation v. Cosby, 1957 OK 263, 317 P.2d 215.

6. Change of Condition for the Worse (COCW)

Upon its own motion or upon the application of any party in interest, on the ground of a change in conditions, the Court may at any time review any award, and, on such review, may make an award ending, diminishing or increasing the compensation previously awarded, … 85 O.S. §28.

Important Cases
1. Nuway Laundry Company v. Hacker, 1964 OK 151, 396 P.2d 659, states "recurrence of temporary incapacity, either before or after a determination of permanent partial disability has been effected, constitutes a change of condition within the contemplation and purview of 85 O.S. §28, and affords a proper basis for an order allowing additional compensation. Hondo Petroleum Company v. Piearcy, Okl., 376 P.2d 1012 , 1013. An additional allowance of temporary benefits may be predicated upon a finding that claimant is in need of medical attention due to a subsequent progression in his compensable condition."
2. Bryant-Hayward Drilling Company v. Cook, 1971 OK 5, 483 P.2d 1131, held that a medical report does not need to state in categorical language that the claimant sustained a change of condition. It is necessary to indicate in some manner, by objective findings, tests, examinations, new findings of conditions which had not existed at the prior hearing or findings of conditions which have worsened subsequent to the last hearing, that there has been a COCW.
3. Oklahoma Gas & Electric v. Black, 1995 OK 38, 894 P.2d 1105, holds that a while increased pain is a factor, a determination of permanent change of condition requires a finding of deteriorated physical condition.
4. University of Oklahoma v. Steinberg, 2001 OK CIV APP 91, 29 P.3d 618, involved a claimant whose bowel and bladder problems were manifested before adjudication of PPD to her back and neck. Res judicata barred claimant from obtaining an award for consequential bowel and bladder problems in a motion-to-reopen proceeding. However, an order to reopen her back injury was affirmed in part because Dr. Hastings found a greater decreased ROM in his 1999 examination when compared to his 1995 exam.
5. Reeves v. Central Sales Promotions, 1981 OK CIV APP 35, 632 P.2d 436, stands for the proposition that pain alone is insufficient to prove a COCW. This is a Judge Brightmire opinion that illustrates what not to do. It is also a good example of how many medical reports are poorly written for COCW by claimants and respondents.

Practice Point
1. Each party must offer a competent medical report that complies with Rules 20, 35 and is credible.
2. Competent doesn’t mean credible.
3. Physician should state the specific reasons for his opinion in clear language instead of expecting that the Court will search the records to find deterioration of findings between prior and current testings, or increased clinical examination findings of loss of ROM, loss of sensation, straight leg raising test, inability to perform daily activities including work, etc.

7. Statute of Limitations for Reopen upon COCW

Governing law is that which was in effect at the time the claimant’s condition underwent a change, and not the law in effect at the time of the injury or the law in force at the time of the original award. Thomas v. University Village Retirement Centers, 2005 OK CIV APP 103, 125 P.3d 692; Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, 16 P.3d 1120, 1122-23.

Claimant has the burden of presenting evidence of the date of his COCW when SOL is an issue. AIM Co. Inc. v. Burns, COCA, Div II, Case No. 103,119 (unpublished).

8. Independent Contractor

The decisive legal test for determining whether a worker was acting as an employee or an independent contractor at the time of the accident is "whether the person for whom services are rendered has the right to control the details of the work or performance." Was claimant hired by the contractor "to work on a particular project according to his personal or unique methods, free from the owner's control and instruction, except as to the result or product?" Brown v. Burkett, 1988 OK 49, 755 P.2d 650.

Page v. Hardy, 1958 OK 283, 334 P.2d 782, is the leading case in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court addresses the factors distinguishing employees from independent contractors. In making the determination of employment status, the trial court will consider these factors as a whole. No single factor is controlling.

Page v. Hardy Factors
1. the nature of the contract between the parties, whether written or oral;
2. the degree of control which, by the agreement, the employer may exercise on the details of the work or the independence enjoyed by the contractor or agent;
3. whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business and whether he carries on such occupation or business for others;
4. the kind of occupation with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without supervision;
5. the skill required in the particular occupation;
6. whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools and the place of work for the person doing the work;
7. the length of time for which the person is employed;
8. the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
9. whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
10. whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant; and
11. the right of either to terminate the relationship without liability.

9. Permanent Total Disability and Disfigurement

An injured party cannot be awarded disfigurement for those body parts determined to constitute permanent total disability. See, G & G Steel Erectors v. Gutierrez, 1984 OK CIV APP 26, 683 P.2d 543, in which the COCA held that a claimant who had been awarded permanent impairment for the loss of an eye could not also be awarded benefits for disfigurement of the eye. However, the COCA held that Gutierrez does not apply if the disfigured body part does not contribute to the claimant’s permanent total disability. McDonald v. M&S Const., Inc., 1994 OK CIV APP 32, 871 P.2d 1389. Therefore, disfigurement from burns, skin grafts, loss of teeth and minor lacerations with scarring can generally be awarded in a permanent total disability case.

Loss of teeth is compensable disfigurement even though repaired by dental surgery. Grinnell Co. v. Smith, 203 Okla. 158, 218 P.2d 1043 (1950). Abdominal scarring from anterior approach lumbar disc surgery is considered compensable disfigurement by some but not all of the Court's judges.

10. Continuing Medical Maintenance (CMM)

The employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital service, medicine, crutches, and apparatus as may be necessary after the injury. 85 O.S. §14.

The employer has a continuing duty under 85 O.S. §14 to furnish medical treatment for a compensable injury for as long as it is needed, and this duty is not limited to the period of temporary total disability. Orrick Stone Company v. Jeffries, 1971 OK 116, 488 P.2d 1243. An injured worker may be awarded CMM for as long as it may be needed if it is included in the permanent partial disability order. Pitchford v. Jim Powell Dozer, Inc., 2000 OK 12, 996 P.2d 935. If properly awarded, CMM is not subject to the Title 85 O.S., §43 limitation period for reopen on a change of condition, Leach v. Hamilton Trucking Co., 2002 OK CIV APP 11, 39 P.3d 824, 828, and continues until the Workers' Compensation Court finds it is no longer needed. Baxter v. Montgomery Exterminating, 1998 OK CIV APP 75, 962 P.2d 666.

A court order placing time limitations on CMM must be based on medical evidence. Since there is no statutory authority for the Workers' Compensation Court to limit CMM as a matter of law, a court's finding limiting CMM to a period of six months is erroneous and must be vacated in the absence of medical evidence. Baxter v. Montgomery Exterminating, 1998 OK CIV APP 75, 962 P.2d 666.

Claimant’s total knee replacement was covered by a 1994 CMM order which only provided for “periodic checkups under the supervision of Dr.Feild.” In 2006 claimant went to Dr. Feild for the first time since the award. Claimant was found to have a deteriorating TKR and needed repair or replacement of its parts. Respondent objected to a request for medical treatment asserting that claimant must seek COCW even though the statue of limitation had clearly expired. On appeal the trial court order authorizing repair of the knee was upheld, and the COCA found that “eventual replacement [of the implant] was a necessary implication of the CMM, although not expressed.” Champlain v. Schwans Sales Enterprises, COCA Div IV, Case No. 102,945 (unpublished).

11. Vocational Rehabilitation

When, as a result of the injury, the employee is unable to perform the same occupational duties he was performing prior to the injury, the employee shall be entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services … which shall include retraining and job placement so as to restore the employee to gainful employment. 85 O.S. §16A.

To establish his right to the vocational benefit the injured employee must show that he is unable to perform the same occupational duties he was performing prior to his injury, and that vocational rehabilitation or job placement will help restore him to gainful employment. 85 O.S. §16A.

If the Court finds that the evidence has met the standard, then "the employee shall be entitled to such vocational rehabilitation services" at an appropriate educational facility (including high school or college) and "shall include retraining and job placement so as to restore the employee to gainful employment." 85 O.S. §16A. If the employee qualifies for benefits, he is entitled to not only vocational counseling and retraining, but also job placement assistance upon completion of the retraining program.

The trial court terminated claimant's vocational rehabilitation benefits when he was academically unable to complete an aviation maintenance course and asked for approval of small engine repair classes in the case of Smith v. Fleming Foods Company, 1998 OK CIV APP 61, 957 P.2d 142. However, the COCA reversed and found that the employer had not discharged its mandatory obligation to retrain the employee. In another case the COCA held "The use of the word 'shall' in this statute indicates the Legislature's intent [in] its directive is mandatory. Collard v. Coldiron Line Trucking, 1987 OK CIV APP 52, 740 P.2d 1209. Therefore, the trial court must grant Claimant such vocational rehabilitation services as will restore him to gainful employment, but may exercise 'discretion in tailoring a rehabilitation plan to fit an individual worker's needs.' J.D. McCarty Center v. Fernandez, 1994 OK CIV APP 121, 889 P.2d 901."

No person shall be adjudicated to be permanently and totally disabled unless first having obtained an evaluation as to the practicability of restoration to gainful employment through vocational rehabilitation services or training.

A claim for permanent total disability (PTD) must be supported by the report of a vocational expert. At the hearing for PTD the Court generally must choose one of three options: 1) deny PTD and determine the extent of the employee's permanent partial disability, 2) order §16D benefits for the purpose "of evaluating permanent total disability status", or 3) award PTD compensation without a §16D trial period. The trial court can select this last option only if competent evidence supports the conclusion that restoration to gainful employment is not practicable. Mangrum v. Fensco, 1999 OK 78, 989 P.2d 461; Superior Bronze and Granite v. Cole, 2005 OK CIV APP 55, 118 P3d 778. Competent evidence would include expert medical and vocational reports corroborated by the testimony of the claimant.

12. Illegal or Undocumented Workers

Illegal workers are not excluded from coverage. The injured illegal worker is entitled to medical treatment, temporary total and permanent total compensation. However, certain benefits may not be available, such as vocational rehabilitation, treatment by a specific physician due to his inability to stay in this country and protection from retaliatory discharge. Cherokee Industries, Inc. v. Alvarez, 2004 OK CIV APP 15, 84 P.3d 798.

The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), which imposes criminal penalties if a worker tenders fraudulent documents to an employer, is not a defense to the payment of benefits. Cherokee Industries, Inc. v. Alvarez, supra.

For vocational rehabilitation versus job placement as it relates to illegal or undocumented workers, see, Sanchez v. Apex Industries, COCA, Div. 4, Case No. 103,639 (unpublished).

On November 1, 2007, most of the provisions of the Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007 became effective. It appears that the Act will not have a significant impact on workers' compensation benefits or the handling of worker claims. For a thorough review of the law in this area, see Undocumented Aliens: Access to Oklahoma Courts and Recent Developments in Oklahoma Law, T. Douglas Stump, presented to the Oklahoma Judicial Conference on November 7, 2007.

13. Pain Management v. Drug Rehabilitation

1. Effect on PTD awards
2. Are we being effective in treating the psychological aspects of pain?
3. Pain Elimination v. Learning to Live with Pain

14. Attorney Fees as Costs

The Court can address the inappropriate conduct of the parties through an award of attorney fees when it finds a party acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. Bond v. Fox Building Supply, 1992 OK 19, 826 P.2d 599.

Court Rule 28(E) permits the Court to "impose up to the total cost of the proceedings, including attorney fees, against a party who is determined to have unreasonably sought or denied benefits, including medical benefits."

15. Objections to Medical Reports

The objecting party must state the specific grounds for the probative value objection, or the objection is waived. In the Matter of Death of Garland, 1998 OK 72, 968 P.2d 1214, 1217 (claimant's attorney was asked for objections the the respondent's medical report and replied "Probative value objection only, Your Honor; and that is that I think it's purposefully vague.").

16. Date of Injury in Cumulative Trauma Cases

Liability for cumulative trauma injuries is governed by 85 O.S. §11(B)(5) which became effective on October 23, 2001.

If date of first awareness (DOAw) precedes 10-23-2001, then DOAw is the date of injury. The Court must apportion liability for benefits among employers and determine the rate of compensation on the DOAw. CNA Insurance Co. v. Ellis, 2006 OK 81, 148 P.3d 874 (Section 11(B)(5) law changes effective 10/23/01 do not apply when the DOAw precedes the effective date and the last exposure occurs thereafter; apportionment is then appropriate).

If DOAw is on or after 10-23-2001, then date of last exposure (DOLE) is the date of injury. Last employer for 90 days of the same injurious exposure is liable for benefits, and rate is the one in effect on the DOLE. Celestica Inc. v. Hines, 2004 CIV APP 22, 86 P.3d 1095 (Legislature intended to make the last exposure doctrine apply to cumulative trauma cases both for determination of the date of injury and for the determination of the liable employer in cases of multiple employers); Parkhurst v. City of Tulsa, 2005 OK CIV APP 59, 119 P.3d 1293 (Rankin v. Ford Motor Co., 1996 OK 94, 925 P.2d 39, finding that the date of injury in a cumulative trauma case is the DOAw, was overruled by statute and the last exposure doctrine applies to cumulative trauma injuries pursuant to 85 O.S., §11(B)(5) for determining the date of injury).

17. TTD in Excess of 300 Weeks

Can the excess be awarded for good cause shown for injuries occurring after November 1, 1997 but before July 1, 2005?

1. COCA, Div II says yes because §22(2)(c) stands alone and does not have any limitation on TTD other than good cause after 156 weeks. Oklahoma Department of Mental Health v. Shamblin, Case No. 103,431 (unpublished).
2. COCA, Div III says no. 85 O.S. §22(2)(c) does not stand alone, but modifies §22(2)(b). Ranchwood Lube v. Woessner, 2004 CIV APP 24, 86 P.3d 1101.

18. Policies of Insurance - Requirements in General

Every practitioner in the workers' compensation system should be familiar with 85 O.S. §64 which establishes the minimum requirements for an insurance policy covering the work-injury risk.

The Administrator has the right to enforce the liability of the carrier. 85 O.S. §64(A).

In Oklahoma, by statute and practice, the employer and its workers' compensation insurer are one and the same with respect to liability for benefits owed to an injured worker. Notice or knowledge of the injury by either the employer or its insurance carrier is notice or knowledge to the other. 85 O.S. §64(B); Sizemore v. Continental Casualty Co., 2006 OK 36, 142 P.3d 47; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Theus, 1972 OK 9, 493 P.2d 433; Supercuts v. Briggs, COCA Div I, released for publication.

Insolvency of the employer does not relieve the employer's insurer of the policy obligations to the employee. 85 O.S. §64(C). In the event of the insolvency of the carrier, it is the employer who is liable for compensaton due under the terms of an award. Rucks-Brandt Const. Corp. v. Silver, 194 Okla. 324, 151 P.2d 399, 401 (Okla. 1944).

Right to elect to include business owners in the policy must be disclosed in writing. 85 O.S. §64(E).

Policy is void "unless it shall also cover liability for the payment of the compensation provided for in this title." 85 O.S. §64(F)

85 O.S. §64(G) provides that "No contract of insurance … shall be canceled within the time limited in such contract for its expiration until at least ten (10) days after notice of intention to cancel such contract, on a date specified in such notice, shall be filed in the office of the Administrator and also served on the employer." Full compliance with Section 64(G) requires notice of cancellation not only to the Administrator, but also service upon the employer of the notice of intent to cancel. Court Rule 63 permits insurers to report proof of coverage information, including notice of intent to cancel, to the Administrator using the NCCI Proof of Coverage system. Notice of intent to cancel provided to NCCI or to the Administrator does NOT serve as notice to the insured employer of the intent to cancel.

19. Liability for Employees of Subcontractor

A general contractor is secondarily liable for injuries occurring to the employees of its subcontractor if the subcontractor has failed to provide coverage and the general contractor has failed to exercise good faith to determine the existence of coverage under a valid insurance policy. 85 O.S. §11B2.

20. Unpublished Opinions

Unpublished opinions of the Court of Civil Appeals are not available on the OSCN database. However, they can be retrieved through the Oklahoma Public Legal Research System which is sponsored by the Office of the Oklahoma Attorney General and is hosted by Onenet.

21. Online Copy of Materials.

This file with links to the cited cases and statutes can be accessed at my website, Oklahoma Workers' Compensation, http://judgetom.wikidot.com/twenty-tips-in-fifty-minutes. You can also find it at my blog site, Judge Tom Talks, http://judgetom.blogspot.com/. For easy usage drop and drag the file address to your desktop or bookmark for future reference.

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